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Abstract: In his Third Oration on Peace Gregory of Nazianzus seeks to 
refute Eunomian claims that the Son and Spirit do not proceed from God’s 
essence and, therefore, are not fully divine. To do so, Gregory modifies a 
piece of triadic speculation—used by Origen and others—to fit his 
particular polemical and doctrinal needs. My aim in this study is to give 
an exposition of Gregory’s argument. After outlining the main points of 
Eunomius’ view of the Son’s deity, I investigate the four dilemmas that 
compose Gregory’s anti–Eunomian argument. The argument is negative 
insofar as it attacks Eunomius’ brand of trinitarianism directly. Even so, in 
the wider rhetorical context of Oration 23 this argument leads naturally 
into a positive account of the Father’s essential production of the Son and 
Holy Spirit. I conclude by detailing some of the main moves of this 
positive trinitarian theology. 
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Introduction 
 
Oration 23, the Third Oration on Peace, is one of Gregory of Nazianzus’ most 
important trinitarian texts.1 In it, he seeks to refute the Eunomian claims that the 
Son and Spirit do not proceed from God’s essence and are therefore not fully 
divine. His refutation includes the following argument, 
 
You posit not a single nor an uncompounded nature of divinity but either three 
that are alienated and disjoined from one another and, not surprisingly, in 
conflict by virtue of their being proportionately superior or inferior; or you posit 
a single nature, but one that is constricted and mean, and which is not in a 
position to be the source of anything significant precisely because it cannot or 
will not, and this for two reasons, either envy or fear: envy, because it wishes to 
 
1 Christopher Beeley (2008) considers the four “major [trinitarian] doctrinal statements” to be 
Orations 20, 23, 25, and the Theological Orations taken as a set (190ff). 
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avoid the introduction of something that is of equal importance; fear, lest it take 
on a hostile and belligerent element. (2003, 23.6) 
 
This brief passage—henceforth ‘The Argument’—presents a series of dilemmas 
meant to undercut the heterousian position and bolster Gregory’s own form of 
pro–Nicene trinitarianism. The line of thought Gregory pursues here is not 
unique to him, but has roots going back at least to Plato, and variants were 
employed by Gregory’s immediate intellectual predecessors, and several of his 
contemporaries.2 Gregory’s formulation stands out from these for its subtlety and 
novel variations on the theme. How specifically did Gregory employ The 
Argument, and was it effective in countering Eunomian advances? Additionally, 
how does The Argument relate to Gregory’s wider trinitarian theology, 
particularly as developed in Oration 23?  
In this study I will address these questions. Taken as a whole Oration 23 is a 
masterful sermon worthy of dedicated attention—attention not yet received.3  
The present study is intended to be a first step toward this end; my hope is that 
better understanding of one of its parts will contribute to a deeper understanding 
of the whole. The part on which I focus sets the polemical portion of the oration 
into motion,4 and reflects many of the rhetorical and theological moves Gregory 
develops throughout the Third Oration on Peace. 
 
1. Opening salvo: You posit not a single nor an uncompounded nature of 
divinity… 
 
By the time Gregory stepped up to the pulpit to deliver Oration 23, theological 
controversy had been building in the East for some time, particularly in its 
capital, Constantinople. Since the 350s Eunomius and his teacher Aetius had been 
active in pushing their theological agenda in the Imperial court and among other 
influential elite. While there was some early success on this front, heterousian 
efforts in the political sphere slowed to a standstill in the 380s (see Vaggione 2008, 
chp.7). At the same time, Eunomius worked from the bottom up. Along with 
several prominent heterousians, he formed a counterpart organization complete 
with bishops, priests, and churches through which they continued instruction 
and liturgy. Heterousian missionaries busily worked to convert non–heterousian 
 
2 I discuss some of these in Dilemma 3 of this paper. This type of argument would continue to 
be employed by trinitarian thinkers from Augustine to Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure. 
Along with the arguments of these medieval thinkers it is an antecedent to those employed by 
contemporary philosophers of religion such as Richard Swinburne (1994, chp.8), Stephen T. Davis 
(2016, 65–68), and William Hasker (2013, 220–223). 
3 McGuckin (1994) gives it sporadic attention. 
4 Gregory addresses his theological opponents directly in parts 6–10; he develops his doctrine 
throughout 6–12. 
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Christians throughout the East, including Constantinople.5 Alongside the 
political, ecclesial, and missionary activity, a war of ideas had been waged in 
print for several decades. Around 360 Eunomius published his Apology; Basil 
responded a few years later with Against Eunomius, followed by Eunomius’ 
Apology for the Apology in the late 370s. By late 380 the situation came to a boil. 
Theodosius issued his famous Cunctos Populous which defined catholic faith in 
part as belief “in the one Divinity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit,” and decreed this as the official religion of the empire. The decree was met 
with immediate resistance: there were protests, church interruptions, Gregory’s 
church–building was vandalized, rocks were thrown at him and his congregants, 
and an attempt was made on his life (Gregory awoke with the would–be assassin 
at his bed–side in tears, confessing to the plot) (Beeley 2008, 36ff). 
It was within these tendentious circumstances that Gregory pleaded to his 
congregants to react in peace, but also combatted Eunomius’ brand of 
trinitarianism. The Argument’s primary target is the idea that the Son (and by 
extension, the Holy Spirit) is not produced from God’s essence, but has a 
different—and ontologically inferior—nature than the one true divinity. 
Gregory’s main goal in Oration 23 is to persuade his listeners that the doctrine is 
bankrupt and he uses every tool available to him rhetorically, theologically, 
philosophically, and conceptually.6 He begins the refutation by telling his 
theological opponents that on their view, the divine nature (θεότητος φύσιν) is 
neither single (μίαν) nor uncompounded (άπλήν). In attendance at his sermons 
would have been homoousians, homoians, pneumatomachians, and 
heterousians. To the latter, in particular, Gregory could hardly have made a more 
shocking claim. Eunomius taught that God is one (εἷς), without parts (ἀμερής), 
simple (άπλοῦς), and uncompounded (ἀσύνθετος) (Apology 8). These attributes, 
along with the claim that the Son is essentially distinct and inferior to the Father, 
all result from Eunomius’ fundamental doctrine that God’s essence is to be 
‘ingenerate’ (ἀγηννήτος). 
 
 
5 On the philosophical nature of the Eunomian apologetic approach see Stępień and 
Kochańczyk–Bonińska (2018, chp.3). 
6 “[O]ne of the most distinctive aspects of Gregory’s doctrine”, Beeley (2008) notes, “is the way 
in which he moves so easily between simple doxology and fine conceptual work.” He continues, 
“Gregory is aware that more technical theological analysis is highly specialized in comparison 
with everyday Christian language, and therefore out of the reach of most believers; and he even 
complains about the risk that is poses of dissolving the faith into ‘sophistics’ (25.17). Yet at the 
same time he is insistent that higher levels of theological understanding build upon the 
foundation of basic faith and that advanced language always serves to articulate that same faith” 
(188). Gregory’s willingness to work on both simple and advanced levels shows in Oration 23 and 
will ultimately play an important part in the large–scale adoption of the pro–Nicene position. I 
will say more about this in the final section. 
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For Eunomius and Aetius, ingenerateness expresses the idea that God is 
completely uncaused: he has no prior cause, nor is he self–caused. In their study 
on divine incomprehensibility during the 4th century, Tomasz Stępień and 
Karolina Kochańczyk–Bonińska summarize Aetius’ position, 
 
In Syntagmation, we find frequent claims on the transcendence of God the Father. 
He is “superior to any cause” (πάσης αἰτίας ὑπάρχει), superior to origination, 
surpasses every nature, and, therefore, God cannot be even called self–caused. 
Simultaneously, we have a precise indication of the essence of God. The term 
“ingenerate” (ἀγεννήτος) plays the central role because it allows [us] to know 
who God is and it alone properly names His essence. Aetius treats “ingeneracy” 
as the very name which is intrinsic to the substance and is revelatory of the 
essence… (Stępień and Kochańczyk–Bonińska 2018, 90–91) 
 
Ingeneracy, then, is the fundamental characteristic of God and is therefore his 
most fitting name. From this stance on God’s ingeneracy follows a corresponding 
strong stance on God’s transcendence, placing strict limitations on divine 
causality. God cannot cause in the sense of natural—that is, essential—
production. This for several reasons. One is that Eunomius understood divine 
production in physical terms, where an essence is shared only if it is divided.7 
But he denied that the divine essence could be divided; this is impossible given 
their view of simplicity as it would allow for the divine essence to be split apart, 
changed, and degenerated (Apology 9). Second, if God produces essentially, two 
entities would share the very same essence, making the divine essence 
compound. Again, a conclusion that strict divine simplicity does not allow 
(Apology 10). Third, and most important to Eunomius, the product of essential 
causation shares the essence of its cause, resulting in a conceptual contradiction: 
to be the divine essence is to be ingenerate; but if, per impossibile, the Son is 
generated essentially, then he is both generated (because Son), and ingenerate 
(because he has the divine nature) (Apology 13). Michele René Barnes has written 
extensively on the nature of causality in 4th century trinitarian theology and 
summarizes Eunomius’ position (1998), 
 
For Eunomius the transcendence of God requires that He cannot be understood 
to generate a product which has the same kind of existence He has, since that 
kind of existence is to be uncaused or unproduced, and any product will 
necessarily (i.e. by definition) be caused. The uniqueness of God’s kind of 
existence means that any productivity must exist outside His nature. (62) 
 
 
7 Neither Aetius nor Eunomius could look past the physical connotations, long part of Greek 
ontology, which accompanied any talk of generation from ousia. See Barnes (2016, 175–179; fn. 
18).   
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For these reasons the Son cannot be caused essentially, and Eunomius finds an 
alternative mode of production in the notion of God’s ‘activities’ (ἐνέργειαι). 
Barnes (1998) again helpfully summarizes Eunomius’ position, 
 
The uniqueness of God’s kind of existence means that any productivity must 
exist outside His nature…According to Eunomius, God’s productive capacity 
can only be that of an activity, energeia, which is external to the essence. This 
external productive activity is that of creating, the only sort of divine production 
that Eunomius recognizes. God’s own activity of creating is limited to the 
production of the second Person; the second Person creates everything else. (60)  
 
Eunomius, then, holds a high view of God’s transcendence, expressed through 
his position on God’s unique ingenerate nature and God’s single act of indirect 
causation via the will as his energeia. While holding this high view of divine 
transcendence, Eunomius simultaneously maintains that Christ is divine. There 
is a tension between these two ideas which we can see in a brief passage from the 
Apology,  
 
We assert that ‘the God of all things’ is the one and ‘only true God’…being, in 
accordance with his pre–eminence, incomparable in essence, power, and 
authority, he begot and created before all things as Only–begotten God our Lord 
Jesus Christ…This only begotten God is not to be compared either with the one 
who begot him or with the Holy Spirit who was made through him, for he is less 
than the one in being a ‘thing made’, and greater than the other in being a maker. 
(25) 
 
Here Eunomius clearly states that the Ingenerate God is the “one and only true 
God”, and yet he also seeks to recognize the Son as divine in some sense. It is this 
tension between the existence of two (or perhaps three) Gods, and only one of 
them being the “true” God, which Gregory attempts to press to the breaking 
point. He does this in The Argument by presenting the heterousian with a series 
of dilemmas. Outlined briefly, Gregory argues that on the Eunomian view, 
 
1. There is either a plurality of divine natures, or one divine nature. 
2. If a plurality of divine natures, then either the divine beings are 
hierarchically arranged, or they are not.  
3. If one divine nature, God does not share the divine essence because 
either he cannot, or he will not. 
4. If God wills not to share the divine essence, he does so because he 
is either envious, or fearful.  
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Each dilemma offers a straightforwardly unacceptable conclusion about God, or 
another dilemma with similarly unattractive options. Let us look at each dilemma 
in turn.  
 
2. Dilemma 1—the status of the Son’s divinity 
 
That Eunomius posits at least one divinity is beyond dispute, but what about the 
Son? Is he, too, divine? We will look at three ways Eunomius answers in the 
affirmative. As we do, it will be helpful to bear in mind the imaginative middle 
ground between full divinity and creation which many in the fourth century 
held. On this point, Lewis Ayers (2004) reminds us that, 
 
At issue until the last decades of the controversy was the very flexibility with 
which the term ‘God’ could be deployed. Many fourth–century theologians 
easily distinguished between ‘God’ and ‘true God’. In discussions of the relations 
between the Son the Father, or between creation and generation, arguments 
about the ‘grammar’ for talking about God were also under way. (14) 
 
A conceptual space which allows for degree of deity runs counter to modern 
sensibilities. But this fact only underscores the long–term effects of pro–Nicene 
achievements, as Ayers (2014) elsewhere concludes, “the ease with which this 
distinction [between divine and created] can be made by modern theological 
readers is itself an achievement of the fourth century” (4). Therefore, as we seek 
to understand Eunomius’ thoughts on the Son’s divinity, we must remain 
sensitive, on the one hand, to “fourth century theologians... [who] made 
distinctions between being ‘God’ and being ‘true God,’” and, alternatively, our 
own adoption of pro–Nicene thought by which we “articulate a clear principle 
that whatever is God...admits of no degrees.” 
One last point of historical context: the Apology is directed mainly against 
homoiousion interlocutors, intent upon elevating the Son (and Spirit) to a share 
of God’s nature.8 To counter this, Eunomius spends much more time explaining 
the ways in which the Son does not share the divine nature than the ways which 
the Son can be said to be divine. Even so, we find Eunomius in several places 
declaring the Son’s deity.9 How should we understand Eunomius’ view of the 
Son? From his extant writings, there are at least three reasons why—or perhaps 
better, three ways in which—the Son is divine. First, the Son is God’s special and 
 
8 According to Vaggione (2008, 161–179), at the time of writing the Apology, the incipient pro–
Nicene movement was not enough of a threat to be on Aeutius or Eunomius’ theological radar. 
9 For example, calling the Son “Only–begotten God” in Apology 15. 
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only creation.10 As such, the Son is subordinate to nothing else in the universe 
except the Father: 
 
We do not, however, include the essence of the Only–begotten among things 
brought into existence out of nothing, for ‘no–thing’ is not an essence. Rather, on 
the basis of the will of the one who made him we establish a distinction between 
the Only–begotten and all other things, affording him that same pre–eminence 
which the maker must necessarily have of his own products. (Apology, 15) 
 
According to this passage the son’s penultimate place on the hierarchy of being 
results from his being begotten by the Father, and being the Father’s only 
begotten. In addition to being God’s only creation, the passage further specifies 
that the Son is specially created by God’s will. This is the second reason for 
believing the Son is divine. Continuing in the passage just quoted, Eunomius 
expands on the relationship between the Son’s unique causation and his 
eminence, 
 
Since he alone was begotten and created by the power of the Unbegotten, he 
became the perfect minister of the whole creative activity and purpose of the 
Father. 
 
As the product of the divine will, the Son has an exalted position on the hierarchy 
of being and, what is more, he is in perfect accord with his Father, making him 
uniquely placed for acts of creation and salvation. As the creator of the cosmos—
i.e., the rest of creation—“he is therefore the Only–begotten God of those things 
which came into existence after him and through him.” For Eunomius, divinity 
is a function of causation: God is ‘God over all’ and the ‘One true God’ because 
he is the ultimate cause of all other existents. As the penultimate cause, the Only–
begotten is not God–to–the–Father, but he is God–to–creation.11 
Third, the Son is worthy of great honour. This because of both his value, as the 
penultimate being, and his creative and salvific actions.12 Like the Father, the Son 
“too conforms to the dignity of its nature.” That is, the Son’s placement on the 
theological hierarchy results in a degree of honour second only to God’s. In one 
 
10 Barnes (2006) notes Eunomius’ hesitancy in calling the Son ‘created’ and his careful 
explanation that the Son is not a product like the cosmos (196). 
11 Gregory attacks this functionalism in 23.10 with an argument ad absurdum: “Trinity does not 
mean an itemized collection of disparate elements; if it did, what would prevent us from calling 
it a decad, or a centad, or a myriad, if the number of components so justified?” In other words, if 
divinity is a function of causality, then each cause is ‘God–to–its–effect’ such that “the 
arithmetical possibilities are many”. Many indeed, since on this account there are as many Gods 
as there are causes. 
12 Eunomius argues that although “the saviour himself” acknowledges “the Only true God”, 
this does not “take away the godhead of the Only–begotten” (Apology 21). 
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place Eunomius indicates that honour appropriate to the Son includes worship. 
The Son creates not according to his will, but solely “at the Father’s command 
and acknowledges that he can do nothing of his own accord, just as the one who 
is worshipped is different from the one who worships.”13    
The Son, then, can be viewed as divine in at least three ways. First, he is God’s 
unique creation. Second, he is specially synced to God’s will and thus specially 
placed to create and save the cosmos. Third, he deserves honour, and possibly 
worship, second only to the Father. This third reason is relatively minor in 
Eunomius’ system.14 The first two receive the most attention, and Barnes (2016) 
summarizes them this way,  
 
When Eunomius discusses the Son’s production, his purpose is to establish that 
since the Son is created directly by God’s will, His essence is prior to all other 
created essences and is, by virtue of its one prior cause, unique among all created 
essences. Eunomius describes the Son as the exclusive product of the Father, and 
maintains that it is the Son who produces “creation,” or the cosmos. Though the 
Son is himself a product…[he is] a creature who, if not God, is nonetheless unlike 
other creatures. (196) 
 
Here Barnes also notes Eunomius’ ambiguity on the status of the Son’s divinity. 
The Son is “a creature who, if not God, is nonetheless unlike other creatures.” 
For the sake of argument let us assume that Eunomius views the Son as divine. 
Even so, Gregory states that Eunomius posits three divine natures. Such a claim 
is not unreasonable given the latter’s teaching that “the Counsellor…is third in 
both dignity (ἀξιώματι) and order (τάξει), we believe that he is third in nature 
as well,” and “He is honoured in third place as the first and greatest work of all, 
the only such ‘thing made’ of the Only–begotten…” (Apology 25) Statements like 
this leads Gregory to conclude that Eunomius posits three divine natures. But 
this conclusion is overly generous given Eunomius’ express thoughts on the 
matter. For instance, the previous quotation Eunomius continues: “…lacking 
indeed godhead (θεότητος) and the power of creation, but filled with the power of 
sanctification and instruction.” 
Thus Eunomius certainly posits three eminent natures, natures thoroughly 
unique among and stationed above all others. I think Eunomius cannot correctly 
 
13 Apology 20. In a note from the critical apparatus, Vaggione (1987) identifies the last sentence 
of this passage as a reference to John 16:14 (60). If so, it is the only instance in the Apology that 
Eunomius mentions worship of the Son as a fitting aspect of his dignity and place on the 
ontological hierarchy. 
14 Certainly, one way to appropriately honour the Son is to accurately identify his place in the 
ontological hierarchy, and to correctly describe it in one’s theological system. Beyond this, 
Eunomius does not elaborate on what honouring the Son might look like. Gregory, however, 
develops the theme in great detail in Oration 23. 
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be said to have posited three divine natures—Gregory’s accusation on this point 
is likely attributed to his desire to kill two theological birds (viz., heterousians 
and pneumatomachians) with one rhetorical stone. Little hangs on this though. 
Still, Gregory’s main point still stands: essentially distinct divinities are 
“alienated and disjoined” from one another. A point Gregory pursues in the 
second dilemma. 
 
3. Dilemma 2—multiple divine natures: alienation and conflict 
 
If the Eunomian admits the existence of multiple divine natures, she faces a 
theological situation in which the divine beings “are alienated and disjoined from 
one another and, not surprisingly, in conflict by virtue of their being 
proportionately superior or inferior.” At this stage The Argument makes three 
claims about the Eunomian view needing examination. 
 
(Claim 1) If there are multiple divine natures, then the natures are 
hierarchically arranged. 
 (Claim 2) If the divine natures are hierarchically arranged, then they are 
disjoined from one another. 
(Claim 3) If the divine natures are hierarchically arranged, then they 
conflict with one another. 
 
All parties agree upon the veracity of Claim 1. Eunomius is quite explicit on the 
matter: “the order of each conforms harmoniously to its nature, so that the first 
in order is not second in nature and the first in nature is certainly not allotted 
second or third place in the order” (Apology 25). How does a being’s nature 
(φύσιν) determine its order (τάξει) to other beings? Our discussion from the 
previous section is helpful here because Eunomius views the hierarchy of natures 
primarily as a matter of causation. The more productive—or potentially 
productive—a being, the greater its nature and, therefore, the higher its order 
among others. In these ways Eunomius readily admits the strict subordination of 
Son to Father, and Holy Spirit to Son.  
Claims 2 and 3 are not obviously true and, depending on the sense in which 
we understand them, are probably not propositions Eunomius would grant. To 
test the claims, we must clarify what Gregory means by ‘disjoined’ and ‘conflict’ 
before moving to his reasons for finding these in Eunomius’ doctrine. The idea 
that Arian theology made the divine hypostases disjoined, or ‘estranged’ 
(ἀπεξενωμένας), from each other had been circulating in the East for some time.  
Dionysius of Alexandra, Dionysius of Rome (both c.250), and Athanasius each 
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employed similar language.15 Gregory raises the idea in several other places, such 
as Oration 31 where he says of the three persons, 
 
one is not more and another less God; nor is One before and another after; nor 
are They divided in will or parted in power; nor can you find here any of the 
qualities of divisible things; but the Godhead is, to speak concisely, undivided in 
separate Persons. (Oration 31.14) 
 
Gregory here explicates some acceptable and unacceptable forms of division. The 
last sentence in the passage is more helpfully translated “the Godhead is in 
separates unseparated” or “undivided in its divisions”16—where the ‘divisions’ 
are the Son and Spirit. Thus, we can speak of some division of deity (θεότης), 
namely, division between persons. However, Gregory refuses to countenance 
any division that entails axiological hierarchy17, temporal separation,18 or division 
of power and will. For Gregory, Eunomius’ hierarchical doctrine fails at all these 
points.  
Gregory elaborates on the theme of division in Oration 20. There he writes of 
the importance to not “adopt the insanity of Arius and divide them [the Father, 
Son, and Spirit] into three entities that are unnaturally estranged (έκφυλα καί 
αλλότρια,) from one another.” Later he again picks up the thought: “Nor, on the 
 
15 Dionysius of Alexandra: “If by the hypostases being three they [i.e., Arians] say that they 
[the hypostases] are divided, there are three, though they like it not. Else let them destroy the 
divine Trinity altogether.” Quoted by Basil of Caeseria (De Spiritu Sancto, 72). Dionysius, Bishop 
of Rome elaborated upon a similar idea: “Next, I may reasonably turn to those who divide and 
cut to pieces and destroy that most sacred doctrine of the Church of God, the Divine Monarchy, 
making it as it were three powers and partitive subsistences and god–heads three. …but they in 
some sort preach three Gods, as dividing the sacred Monad into three subsistences foreign to each 
other and utterly separate.” Quoted by Athanasius (De Decretis VI.26). Athanasius: “Neither can 
we imagine three subsistences separated from each other”; and elsewhere, “we made enquiry of 
them, whether they meant, like the Arian madmen, hypostases foreign (ἀπηλλοτριωμένας) and 
strange (ἀπεξενωμένας), and alien in ousia from one another (ἀλλοτριοουσίους τε ἀλλήλων)…” 
(Tome of Antioch 5). 
16 Ἀμέριστος ἐν μεμερισμένοις ἡ θεότης. The latter translation is that of Browne and Swallow 
(1886, VII). 
17 At times, such as explaining the meaning of John 14:28, Gregory describes the Father as 
greater (Oration 30.7). However, Gregory is always careful to point out the Father possesses the 
fullness of divinity of himself (he is uncaused), and that the Father shares that fullness with the 
Son and Spirit. Thus, the Father possesses no good which is not also had by the Son and Spirit. 
We may say, then, that Father has a certain conceptual priority, but no actual, axiological, 
superiority. Thanks to Oliver Langworthy for bringing this distinction to my attention. 
18 For Eunomius, the Son is outside of or before time (chronos), but within the ages (aeons). 
Gregory makes no such distinction; generation of Son and Spirit are not temporal in any way. 
However, the eternal relations between the persons are far from static: their eternal “movement” 
is highly dynamic (cf. Oration 38.8). (See Langworthy, 2019, pp.19ff.) 
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other hand, ought we divide them into three substances that are either foreign 
(ξένας), dissimilar (ανόμοιους), and unrelated (άπερρηγμένας) (which is to 
follow what is well called the insanity of Arius), or lack order (ἁνάρχους) and 
authority (ἁτάχτους) and are, so to speak, rival gods (άντιθέους).” 
Taking Orations 31 and 20 into consideration along with 23,19 we see that 
essentially distinct divinities are comparable to being estranged, strangers, and 
foreigners. These metaphors may have been convincing to the ‘simpler sort,’ 
those laymen inclined toward Eunomianism,20 but does Claim 2 go beyond 
metaphor? If Claim 2 is to have greater force against the Eunomian, Gregory must 
show that ontological separation presents a more substantive problem for her 
position. We may develop an argument toward this end.21 
To begin with, Eunomius makes claims about the close relationship between 
the Father and Son. The Son is brought into existence purely by the Father’s good 
will, the “Only–begotten exists by virtue of the will of the Father,” (Apology 24)  
he “serves the law of the Father,” and creates “at the Father’s command and 
acknowledges that he can do nothing of his own accord” (Apology 20). The close 
relationship Eunomius describes is intuitively attractive and captures important 
scriptural data. Beyond this, though, Eunomius’ doctrine of creation and 
salvation depend upon a tight relationship between Father and Son. Eunomius 
makes clear that God’s “will is sufficient to bring into existence and to redeem all 
things,” and God accomplishes his will in these areas through the Son. The 
following credal statement captures the Son’s activities as executer of the Father’s 
will, 
 
For we confess that only the Son was begotten of the Father and that he is subject 
to him both in essence and in will (indeed, he himself has admitted that he ‘lives 
because of the Father’ and that he can ‘do nothing of his own accord’)…that what 
the Son is everlastingly is what he is also rightly called: Offspring, obedient Son, 
most perfect Minister of the whole creation and will of the Father, ministering for 
the maintenance and preservation of all existing things, for the giving of the Law 
to mankind, for the ordering of the world and for all providential care…In these 
last days he was born of the holy Virgin, lived in holiness in accordance with 
human laws, was crucified, died, rose again the third day, and ascended into 
heaven. He will come again to judge both the living and the dead by a righteous 
 
19 Gregory gives a similar argument in Oration 25.16, “Neither should we posit three first 
principles if we want to avoid the polytheism of the Greeks, nor a single one, Judaic in its 
narrowness as well as grudging and ineffectual…by disallowing their natures and stripping them 
of Godhead, as our current experts like to do, as though the Godhead feared some rival 
opposition from them or could produce nothing higher than creatures” (2003).   
20 See Vaggione for more on the various theological levels of discourse (2008, 77ff).  
21 Gregory of Nyssa attacks Eunomius on this point from several angles; see Barnes (1998, 73–
79) for some of them. My aim here is to articulate an argument drawn only from the Nazianzen’s 
work and which follows the trajectory began in Oration 23, Claim 2.   
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retribution of both faith and works, and he will reign as king forever. (Apology 
25) 
 
According to this passage all relations between God and the world—creative, 
soteriological, and eschatological—obtain via the Son’s activities. The problem 
with such a scheme is that the ontological separation between Father and Son 
precludes the sort of relationship necessary for these activities. Put another way, 
the Son cannot create, sustain, save, or reign if he is essentially distinct from the 
Father. To see why, recall that God shares nothing of his essence with the Son; 
Eunomius explicitly denies “any apparent similarity of essence” and reminds his 
reader that knowledge of God as Unbegotten “commands [the reader] to reject 
any comparison with another as being wholly foreign to the law of its nature.”22 
He emphasizes the point with an extended discussion of how God’s nature 
(οὐσία) and will (βουλή) are distinct (Apology 23). God’s will, as an energeia, 
communicates nothing essentially to the Son. Stępień and Kochańczyk–Bonińska 
comment upon the “buffer” between Father and Son in Eunomius’ system,  
 
we can see that the generative act of will, which is not identical with essence, 
seems to be a kind of an entity between the Father and the Son. Therefore, the 
similarity of the Son to the Father is not a simple similarity of one substance to 
another, but rather the similarity of the substance of the Son, to the activity of the 
will of the Father. Making such a claim, Eunomius tries to preserve his opinion 
on dissimilarity of substances, and based on this principle, he goes further with 
an explanation how to understand the Son as the “image” (εἰκών) of the Father. 
He uses here [in Apology 24] the same scheme by saying that the Son is not the 
image of the Father, but rather the image of the activity of the Father. (2018, 162) 
 
The problem with Eunomius’ position is that God’s will, in relation to the Son, is 
purely causal activity. God does not share anything of his own with his Son—nor 
could he: given Eunomius’ strong view of simplicity, any communication of 
intentions or emotions would be a communication of the divine essence.23 We can 
put the issue using Eunomius’ causal terminology. For him there is no identity 
between essence and activity, thus God’s essence is distinct from his will, as we 
have seen. Positively, this means that God’s essence is ‘will–less’, non–wilful. The 
upshot is that when Eunomius describes the Son as the image of the Father’s 
 
22 Apology 20. Also Apology 22: “If, then, God is the only true and the only wise God because 
only he is unbegotten, the Son, being only–begotten because he is the Unbegotten’s only 
offspring, could not in fact be anything ‘only’ at all if his nature were made to share a common 
property with some other by means of a ‘similarity’ (ὁμοιότητα).” 
23 God’s name is ‘Ingenerate’ not merely because this best characterizes God, but because this 
is God’s only characteristic. Cf. Apology 8.  For more on Eunomius’ identification of God’s 
ingeneracy with his essence, and his essence with his existence, see Barnes (2016, 200–206).  
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power and will, this means that the Son images an activity, not an essence.24 The 
Son, then, tells us nothing of the Father (an epistemological divide),25 and this 
because he has nothing of the Father’s (an ontological one).  
It seems that, to Eunomius’ mind, the fact that God causes only one product is 
sufficient to make that product God’s Son, and therefore God a father. However, 
we know that a father can produce a chair and produce a child. Even if he only 
produces the former, the chair is not his son. Though Gregory does not use this 
analogy, I think his reasoning follows this line. In Oration 20 Gregory attacks the 
ontological divide: “We must [not] be so partial to the Father that we actually 
strip him of his fatherhood, for whose father would he in fact be if his son were 
different in nature and estranged from him along with the rest of creation?” 
According to Gregory, the gap between the Father and Son is so great that the 
former cannot rightly be called Father. 
This is problematic for Eunomius because, according to him, it is precisely the 
Father–Son relationship which ensures the success of the God–Demiurge–cosmos 
relationship. Stated in Eunomius’ terms: an “Offspring” exists only if a parent 
does too; there can be an “obedient Son” only if he is actually a son; and one is 
the “most perfect Minister of the whole creation and will of the Father” only if 
God is a Father. Finally, the Only–begotten can minister “for the maintenance 
and preservation of all existing things” only if he is “rightly called”—that is, only 
if he actually is—a Son. To Gregory’s mind, God and his product are so distantly 
related that they are little more than strangers. God is not a father; the Only–
begotten not a son; and the both are too disjoined for the latter to know and enact 
the former’s will. 
Summarizing dilemma 2 thus far: Eunomius carefully articulates the 
ontological gap between God and the Only–begotten. He seeks to bridge that gap 
by showcasing the similarity between the Son and the divine will. However, this 
bridge is too tenuous to support the theological freight which Eunomius seeks to 
send across. For Eunomius, the Father–Son relation is necessary for the Son to 
enact the Father’s will (creatively, soteriologically, etc.). If that relation does not 
 
24 Eunomius interprets Paul’s discussion of the Son as image as pointing “not to the unbegotten 
essence…but to the action through which the Son…came to be.” He concludes, “The word 
‘image’, then, would refer the similarity back, not to the essence of God, but to the action…” 
(Apology 24). 
25 Basil develops an epistemological argument along exactly this line. Citing Apology 20 where 
Eunomius argues for the strict distinction between substance and activity, Basil asks “how is it 
possible to reason back from created works to substance? … For things which have been made 
are indicative of power and wisdom and skill, but not of the substance itself. Furthermore, they 
do not even necessarily communicate the entire power of the creator, seeing that the artisan can 
at times not put his entire strength into his activities.” Basil iterates his conclusion, “For if the 
power has nothing in common with the substance, how could he be led from the created works, 
which are the effects of power, to the comprehension of the substance?” (Basil 2011, 2:32). 
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obtain, as Gregory argues, then neither does God’s will for creation, salvation, 
etc. Stated another way, two beings estranged by a complete lack of likeness 
could not share a common will, a common vision for the creation and providence 
of all other existents.  
However, for the sake of argument let us assume that the Only–begotten does 
somehow have knowledge of and is in agreement with God’s will. A state of 
affairs now obtains in which “God does not create, He commands creation (He 
commands into being a creature to carry out the command to create); God does 
not maintain and preserve all things but commands that all things be maintained 
and preserved, and so on” (Barnes 2016, 213). The problem here is that the Son is 
little more than a slave and God little better than a tyrant. In Oration 23 Gregory 
states the issue in more acerbic terms, averring that the heterousian “relegate[es] 
God to a position far removed from any real power, just as on earth of a tyrannical 
or avaricious bent do to those weaker than they” (10).26 God sits as far apart from 
creation as metaphysically possible and, from this distance, commands literally 
all his bidding be done. Gregory earlier argued that God’s servant can hardly be 
called a ‘son’, and now presses the point to argue that the servant is little more 
than slave. 
Additionally, God’s will as cause of the Son give God no direct relation with 
creation. Gregory comments that “what shares the yoke of servitude cannot be 
defined as master, even if it represents the very best that the world of servitude 
and creation has to offer and is the only thing in this vile station to display the 
quality of loving–kindness.” The Father does not relate to creation in love, but 
instead the Son ‘does the loving for the both of them’, further casting God as an 
aloof monarch. Even more unfortunate, the creature who delegates his power 
(and will) is just that: a creature. Though powerful by comparison to the rest of 
creation, the Only–begotten is subject to the same weaknesses of other created 
beings. If one thing is obvious, it is that created persons have a fundamental 
division between their will and God’s; thus the Son would be prone to such 
volitional defect.27 
Claim 3 is the idea that hierarchy among divine beings results in conflict. 
Claim 3 strengthens the idea, from Claim 2, that the Father does not share or 
communicate anything of his own in willing the Son. If true, this looks even more 
worrisome for the Eunomian than the previous claim, since here the Father and 
Son are not merely strangers, but outright enemies. One way Gregory may 
support this claim is to point out the Only–begotten does all the work in creation 
yet receives only a second share of the honour. After all, the Son is a creature—
though at the top of this “vile station”—and so his having enmity or jealousy is 
 
26 Gregory here capitalizes on Eunomius’ employment of language from the moral and 
political sphere to describe divine causation (see Barnes 1993, chp.10; 1998, 61–63, 68–70). 
27 Gregory of Nyssa gives a sustained attack on this front (see Barnes 1998, 73–79).  
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quite plausible. This line of thought may have had traction with listeners who 
were accustomed to similar critique of the Greek pantheon,28 and later in Oration 
23 Gregory moves in this direction saying that positing “disparate” and “diffuse” 
divine natures “is thoroughly…Greek and polytheistic” (40). 
In sum, The Argument gives a brief attack on the ontological distance 
Eunomius places between God and the Only–begotten. With resources Gregory 
provides in Oration 23 and elsewhere, this attack can be shown to advance in 
several directions: it can include psychological estrangement (of desires and 
intentions); filial absence (so that the Only–begotten is not in fact God’s son in 
any meaningful way); lowly servitude (where the Son serves the Father but has 
no relational connection or support); and the possibility—if not inclination—for 
the Only–begotten (as a mere created thing) to disagree with God’s will. Gregory 
may point to any of these as good reasons for why there is conflict between 
divinities on the Eunomian view. 
 
4. The second horn of dilemma 1: a single divine nature 
 
In the face of these difficulties the Eunomian may choose to recognize the 
existence of one, and only one, divine nature.29 This route, too, presents worries. 
The problem is that a lone God is “constricted, mean, and not in a position to be 
the source of anything significant.” What does Gregory have in mind here? A 
pure monad is ‘constricted’ (μιχροπρεπή) in that he is ‘closed’ and ‘cut–off’ from 
all others,30 reflected in the total lack of communication which makes him ‘mean’ 
(στενήν), or ‘petty’—even ‘underdeveloped’—in relation to all other existents. 
Further, God is not “the source of anything significant” (έχουσαν τὸ μεγάλων 
είναι αρχήν). By this Gregory means God’s only creation, viz. the Son, is just 
that: a mere creature. One who is powerful and active in the universe to be sure, 
but only as the topmost rung on a very finite ladder—a cosmic instance of gallum 
in suo sterquilinio plurimum posse.31 The Son’s insignificance is made more acute 
when we take into consideration Gregory’s formula that only that which is 
 
28 Criticism of the gods for being at odds with one another came at least far back as 
Xenophanese (Fragments B11 and B12), later followed by Plato (Euthyphro, Republic). Gregory 
registers a complaint to this effect in Oration 27.6. Athanasius argues that a plurality of gods 
would necessarily lead to conflict of wills, rejecting the idea as impious and ridiculous (Against 
the Pagans 39). Eusebius argues along similar lines (Demonstrations of the Gospel 4:5).  
29 Such a recognition probably excludes predicating deity to the Son even in an equivocal, 
analogical sense. If so, the Son is not to be viewed functionally divine as, for example, seen in 
claim that “he is therefore the Only–begotten God of those things which came into existence after 
him and through him” (Apology 15). 
30 Bailly (1935) supplies a helpful list of uses of στενός in antiquity. 
31 “Every cock crows upon his own dunghill.” See Seneca Apocolocyntosis VII. 
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assumed by God can be saved.32 All parties in the debate agree on the creative 
and soteriological accomplishments of the Son. Gregory argues that no mere 
creature, however highly placed among other creatures, can accomplish that 
work—rendering the Son insignificant along with the rest of creation. We have 
already seen Gregory fault Eunomius’ position for making the Son wear “the 
yoke of servitude”. Now Gregory presses the attack in arguing that the Son is the 
most pitiful of all creatures, since he is made only to bring about and save 
creation. In other words, the Son alone among all other creatures is purely a 
means to an end, rendering him even more “inconsequential and unworthy of 
divinity” since “everything that exists for the sake of something else is held in 
less esteem than the thing for which it was produced” (23.7). In sum, if there is 
only a single divine nature, then God’s best and only product is quite pitiable, 
which reflects poorly upon God himself. 
 
5. Dilemma 3: God does not produce essentially because he cannot or will not 
 
Gregory advances the attack by considering why God would not share his 
essence in connatural production. To his mind there are only two possible 
explanations: God cannot, or God will not. Both explanations make the second 
lemma of dilemma 2 even more unattractive. This sort of argument is not unique 
to Gregory but had been used in various forms for some time.33 Origen argued 
thus, 
 
And who that is capable of entertaining reverential thoughts or feelings 
regarding God, can suppose or believe that God the Father ever existed, even for 
a moment of time, without having generated this Wisdom? For in that case he 
must say either that God was unable to generate Wisdom before He produced 
her, so that He afterwards called into being her who formerly did not exist, or 
that He possessed the power indeed, but—what cannot be said of God without 
 
32 “If anyone has put his trust in Him as a Man without a human mind, he is really bereft of 
mind, and quite unworthy of salvation. For that which He has not assumed He has not healed; 
but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved” (Gregory, 1894a). 
33 Plato reasoned that the framer of the universe “was good, and what is good has no particle 
of envy in it” and so the best and highest god is both willing and able to share his goodness, 
resulting in another “blessed god” (Plato 1976, 4 & 5). See also Phaedrus 247a: “…there is no envy 
(φθόνος) in the choir of the gods.” Plotinus expanded upon the idea this way: How then could 
the most perfect remain self–set—the First Good, the Power towards all, how could it grudge or 
be powerless to give of itself, and how at that would it still be the source? If things other than 
itself are to exist, things dependent upon it for their reality, it must produce since there is no other 
source. And, further, this engendering principle must be the very highest in worth; and its 
immediate offspring, its secondary, must be the best of all that follows.” (Plotinus 1991, 388) Note 
that both Plato and Plotinus’ arguments point to a second divine being, but one that is 
subordinated in power and goodness to its progenitor.  
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impiety—was unwilling to use it; both of which suppositions, it is patent to all, 
are alike absurd and impious. (Origen 1885. I.2.2) 
 
This expression of the argument includes two ideas pertinent to Gregory’s own. 
First, Origen argues that the Son is eternally generated, but the argument 
underdetermines the precise status of the Son’s divinity. Gregory adapts this 
claim to fit his particular anti–Eunomian needs, strengthening it to conclude that 
the Son is produced essentially (and therefore eternally).34 Second, Origen argues 
if God does not share his essence, then God is impotent or unwilling. According 
to Origen, both options commit gross impiety. Gregory clarifies and expands 
upon this dilemma by showing just how bad the second option is. That is, God’s 
will to not produce essentially can only be explained in two ways: God is either 
envious or fearful. 
 
6. Dilemma 4—God wills to not produce essentially out of envy or fear 
 
The final dilemma presents the Eunomian with two obviously unacceptable 
options. First, God wills to not share the divine essence with another due to envy 
“because [he] wishes to avoid the introduction of something that is of equal 
importance.” Like Gregory, Eunomius recognizes that anything God produces 
connaturally is of equal value (Apology 9). Eunomius also recognizes that the 
honour due God is given in accordance to his place at the top of the hierarchy of 
being, as we have already seen. Thus, to avoid sharing his honour God refrains 
from producing connaturally. Second, God refrains from producing connaturally 
out of fear, “lest [the product] take on a hostile and belligerent element.” In other 
words, God anticipates disagreement with a connatural hypostasis and, to avoid 
conflict with an equal, avoids having an equal altogether. 
Coming from Gregory, this second lemma is curious because it looks to be as 
much a problem for his trinitarianism as it is for Eunomius’. On Gregory’s view 
the Son is of equal value (power, wisdom, etc.) with the Father, and yet there is 
no conflict; indeed because of their shared goodness and will, there is no 
possibility for conflict. Eunomius could grant that, per impossibile, the Father shares 
his essence with the Son, then there would be no envy. Like Gregory, Eunomius 
would reject the lemma out of hand. It appears as if Gregory presents it more for 
the sake of structure (balancing The Argument with one dilemma after another) 
 
34 Basil (2011, 2.12) makes a similar move, “If being Father is good and fitting to the blessedness 
of God, how is that which is fitting for him not present in him from the beginning? For the lack 
will certainly be considered either a matter of ignorance of what is better or a matter of inability. 
As a matter of ignorance, if he discovered what is better only later; as a matter of inability, if while 
knowing and understanding it he failed to attain what is best.” 
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or rhetorical points (mis–characterizing one’s opponents was a move neither 
party was above making when they thought they could get away with it).   
 
7. The Argument and Gregory’s trinitarian theology 
 
In The Argument, Gregory identifies and seeks to exploit several points of 
tension within the Eunomian doctrine of the Son’s deity. While Gregory is correct 
to press on these tensions, The Argument is not a knock–down one. The 
committed Eunomian would happily grant the first horn of Dilemma 3, viz., that 
God does not share the divine nature because he cannot. All parties agree that 
there are certain actions impossible for God, and sharing the divine essence tops 
the Eunomian’s list. Thus God is impotent in regards to connatural production, 
but only trivially since such production is impossible. God is no worse off for not 
essentially begetting a son than he is for not creating square circles. Similarly, 
God may be mean, but this too is trivial since God does not give what is 
impossible to give. Finally, a monadic God may be constricted but, from the 
Eunomian perspective, this highlights God’s complete otherness: one 
theologian’s divine constriction is another’s divine transcendence. 
The Eunomian’s best option, then, is to stick to her original claim that God 
does not share the divine essence because he cannot, and to then point out that 
any attributions of meanness, constriction, or impotence are either vacuous or 
actually signal her high view of divine transcendence. With his opponent having 
dug–in her heels, how may Gregory move forward? Short of attacking her 
metaphysics of causation head–on—which he does not attempt—I’m not sure 
Gregory could dislodge the entrenched Eunomian. 
In Oration 23 Gregory instead proceeds in two ways. Negatively, he continues 
the rhetorical attack on the Eunomian position; positively, he contrasts the 
unseemly commitments in Eunomianism with attractive elements from his own 
trinitarian theology. I will conclude this essay by focusing on Gregory’s 
deployment of this two–fold strategy along the lines of honour, one of the primary 
themes of the oration and a theme important to Eunomius.35 Generally, Gregory 
thinks of honour axiologically: the greater a thing, the more honourable it is. 
Practically, this leads us to commend, praise—and for the most honourable 
object—worship.  
 
35 The concept of honour is used throughout the Apology. Early in the tract Eunomius implores 
his followers to “honour the teaching of our Saviour Jesus Christ” by believing the truth of his 
(Eunomius) message (2). Once Eunomius begins his argument proper he quickly employs honour 
as part of the reason for positing a single God, since there must exist a single source having “the 
dignity of the Godhead” (7). He next explains that to be unbegotten is to be most worthy of 
honour (Apology 8). He finishes the tract with the warning that “those who through ill–will have 
dishonoured” the true faith face inexorable punishment (27). 
GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS’ TRINITARIAN ARGUMENT 
19 
 
Following the two–fold strategy, Gregory first critiques Eunomius’ doctrine 
for dishonouring God, the Son, and the Spirit. Gregory then argues that his view 
of connatural production holds the higher view of God’s honour. The following 
argument sketches the main lines of attack, 
 
In fact, God is the object of proportionately more honour than his creatures are 
to the degree that it is more in keeping with the greater majesty of the first cause 
to be the source of divinity rather than of creatures and to reach the creatures 
through the medium of divinity rather than the reverse, that is, for divinity to 
acquire substantive existence for their sakes, as our very subtle and high–flown 
thinkers imagine. (23.6)36 
 
Akin to perfect being theology, we may describe this form of argumentation as 
perfect honour speculation. The passage above contains two arguments. The first, 
stated very roughly: it is more honourable to produce essentially than not.37 The 
second parallels the first: it is more honourable for God to save creatures through 
another divine being than through a creature. The success of both arguments 
depends on the principle that, ceteris paribus, a doctrine which posits a higher 
view of God is to be preferred—call this the Greatest Honour principle. This 
principle is used again in the following two–part argument (I will number both 
parts), 
 
Or are you unaware that in regarding God as the source of “creatures,” by which 
I mean the Son and the Holy Spirit, you [1] not only fail to honour the source but 
you [2] also dishonour whatever issues from it?” (23.7)  
 
36 Oration 23.6. A similar argument is made in 23.7: “For if, while admitting the dignity of the 
Son and the Holy Spirit, we implied that they are either without source or from a different source, 
we should in fact face the terrible risk of dishonouring God or of setting up a rival deity. But if, 
no matter how highly you exalt the Son or the Spirit, you…attribute their noble generation and 
marvellous procession to him, I shall simply ask you…who dishonours God more, the one who 
regards him as the source of the kinds of beings you yourself introduce, or the one who regards 
him as the source not of such, but of those which are like him in nature and equal to him in 
honour, the kind that our doctrine professes?” 
37 We may outline the first argument in a bit more detail this way: 
1. A cause is greater than its effect. (A Platonic principle accepted by all in the 
debate). 
2. Therefore, the greater the effect, the greater cause.  
3. A divine being is greater than a created one. (Another shared assumption). 
4. Therefore, if God causes a divine being, he is greater than if he (only) causes 
creatures. 
5. God is honourable to the degree he is great. (A shared assumption). 
6. Therefore, if God causes a divine being, he is more honourable than if he (only) 
causes creatures. 
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Gregory explains part 1 saying, “You dishonour the source by referring it to 
beings that are inconsequential and unworthy of divinity”. This explanation is a 
straightforward employment of the Greatest Honour principle and parallels the 
argument we just looked at. In the next part Gregory expands the range of his 
critique, 
 
you dishonour the issue, by making them inconsequential, and not merely 
creatures, but of all creatures the least honoured. If in fact it was for the sake of 
these creatures that the Son and the Spirit came into existence at some point in 
time, like a craftsman’s tools that do not exist before the craftsman has made 
them, their only reason for being would be that God chose to use them to create 
something, on the grounds that his will was not enough; for everything that 
exists for the sake of something else is held in less esteem than the thing for which 
it was produced. (23.7) 
 
Part 2 specifies the Son’s truly low worth, since he is valuable only insofar as he 
is a means to an end. If Gregory is correct about means being less valuable than 
their ends, then, contrary to intuitions, creation is ranked higher than the Only–
begotten. Having argued for the immensely low degree of honour afforded to the 
Son by non–homoousian views, Gregory immediately employs the Greatest 
Honour principle positively. 
 
I, on the other hand, by positing a source of divinity that is independent of time, 
inseparable, and infinite, honour both the source as well as its issue: the source, 
because of the nature of the things of which it is the source; the issue, because of 
their own nature as well as of the nature of the source from which they are 
derived, because they are disparate neither in time, nor in nature nor in holiness. 
(23.8) 
 
Here Gregory directly contrasts his view with the Eunomian’s. For Gregory, the 
Father’s essential production of the Son and Spirit ensure that all parties are 
rightly elevated in dignity. The extent of their honour is showcased most 
powerfully when Gregory describes God’s monarchy, that is, the nature of the 
Father’s essence which he gives to Son and Spirit, 
 
a nature that is in internal agreement with itself, is ever the same, ever perfect, 
without quality or quantity, independent of time, uncreated, incomprehensible, 
never self–deficient, nor ever so to be, lives and life, lights and light, goods and 
good, glories and glory, true and truth, and Spirit of truth, holies and holiness 
itself; each one God, if contemplated separately, because the mind can divide the 
indivisible; the three God, if contemplated collectively, because their activity and 
nature are the same; which neither rejected anything in the past as superfluous 
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to itself nor asserted superiority over any other thing for there has been none; nor 
shall leave anything to survive it or will assert superiority over anything in the 
future, for there will be none such; nor admits to its presence anything of equal 
honour since no created or servile thing, nothing which participates or is 
circumscribed can attain to its nature, which is both uncreated and sovereign, 
participated in and infinite. (23.9) 
 
Read in its polemical context and with an eye toward the theme of honour, we 
are in a position to feel some of the force of this passage. For here we encounter 
a list of the glories the Father shares with his Son and Spirit, including perfection, 
complete fullness, and activity. The prose is a majestic presentation of the riches 
of the Godhead, part of Gregory’s overarching intention to make his theologizing 
truly ‘theological.’ Beeley outlines some of what this entails, 
 
In Gregory’s view, Christian theology involves and represents a dynamic, live 
relationship between God and the theologian, and so it begins not with abstract 
information about God…but with the transformation of the theologian within 
the horizon of God’s presence and activity in the world, as it is recognized and 
celebrated in the life of the church. (Beeley, 2008, 64) 
 
Gregory enacts this transformation by presenting the great dignity due to Father, 
Son and Spirit in hopes that it leads to actual honour and worship from his 
congregants. At the same time, interwoven among beautiful prose is some 
technical and precise conceptual work. For example, Gregory employs the ‘X 
from X’ language common since the third century (see Ayres 2004, chps. 6 & 7). 
Whereas in many writers such language is ambiguous, here it is quite precise, 
introducing a participation metaphysics to clarify the exact nature of “light from 
light,” etc. 
Beyond the polemic sphere we may compare the Apology with The Argument 
and Oration 23. On the one hand we have Gregory’s masterful weaving of 
technical precision with affective force and the ultimate goal of a living theology. 
Contrasted with Eunomius’ focus on technical precision alone, we see how 
Gregory’s teaching successfully crafted a “narrative theology”, one which 
appealed to the ἀκεραιοτέροι—the ‘salt of the earth’, or masses—setting it on a 
trajectory for becoming the dominant view (Vaggione 2008, 77ff). 
  
Conclusion 
 
In Oration 23 Gregory modifies a traditional piece of triadic speculation to fit his 
particular needs. Polemically, those needs include showing the pitfalls of 
heterousian, homoian, and pneumatomachian doctrines of the Son’s deity. 
Rhetorically, The Argument slots comfortably into Gregory’s employment of 
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honour as an argumentative device, showing his full–blown homoousianism to 
be at once more honouring to the Father as well as the Son and Spirit. Finally, 
Gregory makes the argument approachable for ‘the masses’ by focusing on 
affectively powerful, rhetorical points. Even so, it affords him the chance to offer 
a nuanced positive trinitarian theology that would satisfy those with more 
theological training.38 
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